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The paper discusses the role of various constituencies in the corporate governance of a 
corporation from the perspective of incomplete contracts. A strict shareholder value 
orientation in the sense of a rule that at any time firm decisions should be made strictly in 
the interest of the present shareholders would make it difficult for the firm to establish 
long-term relationships as the potential partners would have to fear that, at a later stage of 
the co-operation, the shareholders or a management acting only on their behalf could 
exploit them because of the inevitable incompleteness of long-term contracts. 
One way of mitigating these problems is to put in place a corporate governance system 
which gives some active role to the other stakeholders or constituencies, or which makes 
their interests a well-defined element of the objective function of the firm. A commitment 
not to follow a policy of strict shareholder value maximization ex post can be efficient ex 
ante. Such a system would clearly differ from what is advocated by proponents of a 
"stakeholder approach", as it would limit the rights of the other constituencies to those 
which would have been agreed upon in a constitutional contract concluded between them 
and the founder of the firm at the time when long-term contracts are first established. 
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I would like to start by admitting that initially I had the problem of finding out precisely what it 
is that I am supposed to talk about today. The topic "the role of other constituencies" was 
assigned to me by the organisers of this conference. Evidently, "other constituencies" must in 
some way be understood as those which are not the main constituencies or, to put it differently, 
constituencies other than those whose legitimate and factual role in the context of corporate 
governance is beyond any reasonable doubt. A common view of corporate governance is that it 
is about how to make managers act in the interest of shareholders. Thus, it first seemed to me 
that I was expected to talk about "other constituencies" as opposed to shareholders. However, in 
a preliminary version of the programme, the complete title reads: "The role of other consti-
tuencies: employees, stockholders". Thus my first guess was apparently wrong.  
Still in search of a topic, I took a closer look at the programme for this conference. One of the 
main issues to be dealt with this morning is the role of the board - i.e. the board of directors or 
the conseille des administrateurs. So I thought I might take the term "others" to mean "other 
than the board". However, for me as a German this interpretation is also difficult to accept at 
face value because in the German co-determination system the influence of the employees on 
corporate governance is meant to be exercised through the supervisory board, whose members 
include representatives of the firm's workforce.  
I finally concluded that if defining my assignment posed a problem, then this only served to 
underscore the wisdom of the organisers of this conference. I say this for two reasons. One is 
that they want us foreigners to be aware of the fact that France is a special case, also with 
respect to corporate governance issues (Pastré, 1997). Specifically, in France shareholders seem 
to be among the "other constituencies", whereas the central agent is probably the PDG and, 
with less importance, the conseil des administrateurs (CNPF, 1995). Secondly, they seem to 
want me to discuss the topic of corporate governance from a very general perspective and not to 
be misled by my professional background as a financial economist. However, while financial 
economists would typically subscribe to the narrow conception that corporate governance is 
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emphasise right at the beginning that I do not share this belief, and I shall explain my reasons 
for this in the present paper.  
Thus, I would like to discuss a broader notion of corporate governance which explains why 
corporate governance should also take into account the roles and the interests of constituencies 
other than shareholders and a board representing only them. I did not, of course, describe my 
initial puzzlement at the exact nature of my assignment in order to complain. On the contrary: I 
am very happy with the task as I have just now defined it because in my view one of the funda-
mental issues of corporate governance is precisely the question of why different constituencies 
play a role in the context of corporate governance and what "playing a role" means in this con-
text. It can mean two things: that a given group of people do something (or play an active role), 
or that their interests are considered to be legitimate, i.e. that they "matter". These two things 
need not coincide. The interests of a person or a group may be central to a social system, and 
still the person (or persons) in question may not have any active role. And the most general 
question in this context is this: Whose decision problem is it to design a corporate governance 
system, and who or which entity assigns active roles and determines whose interests matter?  
 
2. Some Basic Definitions 
a) The notion of corporate governance: Referring specifically to profit-oriented, large firms in 
the legal form of corporations, I shall use the term "corporate governance" as follows: corporate 
governance is the totality of the institutional and organizational mechanisms, and the corre-
sponding decision-making, intervention and control rights, which serve to resolve conflicts of 
interest between the various groups which hava a stakes in a firm and which, either in isolation 
or in their interaction, determine how important decisions are taken in a firm, and ultimately 
also determine which decisions are taken (Schmidt/Tyrell, 1997, p. 168, based on Williamson, 
1985, p. 298-325). The most important relevant factors and mechanisms are the law, the 
structure of the financial sector of the country, market factors in input and output markets, and 
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definition is the notion of a (large) firm as a nexus of contracts (Jensen/Meckling, 1976). This 
notion is not precise, but it conveys two simple and important messages:  
(1)   There is, at least in principle, a contractual element in all relations between any group of 
resource providers and "the firm" (as the central contracting agent) or between all 
resource providers.  
(2)   Different parties to the network of contracts have differently defined rights to influence 
what decisions are taken. Although they may want to use these rights in their own interest 
or as they see fit, the outcome of their efforts to shape events will not only depend on 
what they want, but also on what others want to do and can do. There is thus no simple 
correspondence between the right to influence and the degree to which this leads to 
outcomes which reflect interests or wishes.  
b) The notion of good - or workable - corporate governance: Whether corporate governance is 
good or workable depends on the "quality" of the decisions made in a firm. "Good" outcomes 
can be defined as those which  
(1)   further the interests of the present shareholders to the maximum extent possible, e.g. by 
leading to the highest share price ("shareholder value concept", narrowly defined), or    
(2)   further a somehow "weighted" average of the interests of different constituencies to the 
maximum extent possible, or    
(3)   ensure the survival, and perhaps also the growth, of a firm by enabling it to pay compet-
itive prices for all the requisite inputs and to offer its products at competitive and cost-
covering prices.  
Evidently, these three definitions of "good" or "workable" outcomes are not necessarily 
antagonistic or mutually exclusive. However, they are also not necessarily one and the same 
thing merely expressed or looked at in three different ways. 
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a) The narrow view. According to the narrow view, which Margaret Blair (1995, pp. 12f.) calls 
"the finance model", a large public corporation is the property of its shareholders, who are - by 
definition, it would seem - its owners. As there are many shareholders who lack the knowledge 
needed to run the firm and who could never reconcile their differing views and interests, a large 
firm is run by managers. In the ideal case, the firm is run by the managers in exactly the same 
way as the owners would run it if they knew how to do it. Of course, real managers have in-
terests of their own and are also aware that it is difficult for the owners to monitor them. This 
gives rise to what I call the narrow view of the corporate governance problem: How can man-
agers be made to act in such a way that, to the greatest extent possible, their actions are in the 
interest of the current shareholders of a corporation?  
There are two well-known answers to this question. One is the Anglo-Saxon answer. It amounts 
to saying that there is a market for corporate control which does the trick: The permanent threat 
that some other management team could take over the company should motivate the incumbent 
managers to prevent a hostile take-over (Schmidt, 1989; von Thadden, 1990). They will best be 
able to defend their position if they make a take-over attempt as difficult, and notably as expen-
sive, as possible. This can be done by seeing to it that the share price is as high as possible, 
which is exactly what the shareholders would want them to do.  
The other answer, which would be more in the spirit of continental European economic 
systems, is that mechanisms like supervisory boards, duties of care and loyalty, reputation, 
financial incentives, peer pressure, etc., can be put in place and made to operate in such a way 
that in principle managers will act in the shareholders' interests (Roe, 1994).  
As is well-known, in reality these two solutions to the problem - which come close to 
embodying what Franks and Mayer (1995) call the "outsider system" and the "insider system" - 
do not work perfectly, and the extent to which they work at all depends above all on the 
structure of a given country's financial sector.  
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ask why a large firm should be run exclusively in the interest of its shareholders in the first 
place. The - alleged - fact that the shareholders are "the owners" is often implicitly taken as 
sufficient justification, although this is of course circular reasoning (Blair, 1995, p. 202). 
However, general equilibrium theory does provide a sound rationale for the narrow concept: If 
all contracts with all providers of resources were perfect and complete, and if financial markets 
were also perfect and complete, profit (or shareholder value) maximising behaviour would lead 
to an efficient allocation of resources and an optimal position of all "stakeholders" (including 
shareholders) in a corporation (Hart, 1995), and it would be the best way of ensuring the 
survival of the firm. However, these very stringent conditions are not fulfilled in reality. If they 
were fulfilled, though, the problem of managers acting in a way which was not in the best 
interest of the shareholders could not arise in the first place, and thus there would be no need to 
bother about corporate governance because it would always be possible to write and enforce 
complete contracts between the shareholders and the managers (see Hart, 1995, and 
Schmidt/Terberger, 1996, p. 392).  
b) The broader view: It is not self-evident that firms should - or can - always be run solely in 
the interest of their (present) shareholders. Instead of a one-sided shareholder orientation, one 
could advocate a pluralistic concept of "stakeholder orientation". Or one could argue that a 
large firm is more than just an association of its shareholders and that we should distinguish 
between the loyalty which the managers owe the corporation as a legal entity composed of all 
shareholders on the one side and, on the other, the loyalty which they owe the firm as an 
economic and social entity composed of all stakeholders including shareholders as well as 
important lenders, core employees, long-term clients and suppliers, the local community and 
even the respective nation or country. This is the common view of the advocates of a 
"stakeholder orientation", and it can also be found in relevant legal doctrines 
(Schmidt/Spindler, 1997, and Blair, 1995, p. 235). Evidently, in this context other 
constituencies would have a role to play at least in the sense of their interests being relevant 
from a normative point of view and also of them having at least a certain active role to play. 
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different aspects. One aspect is that the role or task of deciding "fairly" how much weight 
should be assigned to the different stakeholders' interests would fall to the managers and 
enhance the power which they in any case have. Moreover, they can hardly be expected to 
make this decision in a disinterested and equitable manner as they themselves are one of the 
interested parties - or "other" constituencies or stakeholder groups - and how they function as 
arbitrators between different groups may affect their own role as managers considerably. From 
the shareholders' perspective, they are likely to give too much weight to the interests of other 
stakeholders. The second aspect is that even though managers are considered as being 
accountable to several groups of stakeholders, there is still a need to limit their discretionary 
powers, which they could use to further their own interests. In fact, the vagueness of their 
obligations towards several groups of stakeholders is likely to expand the scope of their 
discretionary powers and thus to make the central problem of corporate governance, namely the 
agency problem of binding managers as agents to the interests of their principals, all the more 
difficult (Schmidt/Spindler 1997).    
 
4. A Contractual View of the Corporate Governance Problem 
For an economist, the narrow concept of corporate governance as a mechanism to ensure that a 
firm is managed solely in the interest of its shareholders is more appealing than the notion of 
corporate governance as a process of balancing the interests of different groups of stakeholders 
and managing a company in their common interest. The narrow concept is consistent and well-
defined and its implications are straightforward. In contrast, the "stakeholder approach" makes 
every economist uneasy as too many questions are left open: What should be the yardstick for 
weighing or aggregating different interests? Why should the management, which after all also 
constitutes a group of "stakeholders", be trusted to strike a "fair" balance between the interests 
of the different groups? And what is the welfare-economic rationale for the entire approach?  
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strictly shareholder-oriented corporate governance system, there is no denying that the stringent 
conditions under which the exclusive adherence to a policy of maximising profit or shareholder 
value is applicable, and also attractive from a normative standpoint, are not fulfilled in reality. 
In a world of imperfect and incomplete contracts and capital markets (or non-negligible 
transaction costs), the a priori arguments that can be advanced to explain why major decisions 
in large firms should only be taken in the interest of the shareholders (according to the objective 
function of maximising the market value of the equity) are rather weak, and share prices are at 
best an incomplete indicator of what the common interest of all shareholders is and the extent to 
which management serves this interest (Hart, 1993). In the following, I wish to suggest a 
general concept of what could be a guideline for the design of a corporate governance system. It 
takes at least some of these problems into account and implies a double role for "other 
constituencies" in corporate governance: the role of being people whose interests should count 
as well as an active role in the workings of a corporate governance system.  
In a world in which information and incentive problems are not easily solved, many contracts 
are incomplete. Among other things, this gives rise to the hazards of opportunism, and this in 
turn makes it difficult for all parties to enter into long-term relationships  which would be 
attractive for both sides if only there were not the danger of their being exploited (or "held-up" 
in the sense of Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978) once they have made relationship-specific 
investments. Other potential stakeholders, such as lenders, employees and suppliers, could 
rightly be concerned that a given firm - or its owners or its management acting solely in the 
owners' interest - will use any chance to profit from acting opportunistically if the future 
provides an opportunity for such behaviour (Shleifer/Summers, 1988). They would therefore try 
to avoid getting into a situation in the first place in which they would suffer from such 
behaviour. If the firm wishes to dispel these concerns in order to induce potential partners 
(stakeholders) to enter into long-term relationships, it must find ways to bind itself and to 
indicate that it will abstain from abusing any dependence, i.e. power, which might result from 
the relationship. Putting potential partners at ease will be difficult or impossible if it is 
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who will then be shareholders or, in other words, if it is clear that profit or shareholder-value 
maximisation will be the only concern at any given time.  
So what can a firm do? Simply promising that it (or its owners or managers) will not act oppor-
tunistically would be "cheap talk": it would not create a binding commitment to adhere to what 
has been promised (Schelling, 1960). Nevertheless, before asking how a credible commitment 
could be created, it is worthwhile asking what would be promised or what would be the sub-
stance of a contract under the ideal condition that words would be credible. The answer is, 
generally speaking, that potential partners would be promised a contingent claim which they 
would value at least as highly as the best alternative open to them before they enter into the 
relationship. For various reasons, this claim would have to be contingent on what will happen 
in the future, and the persons who have at some point made a promise or concluded what 
amounts to an implicit contract may no longer be in command in the future, and this is why it 
would be so difficult to make a simple enforceable promise or to conclude explicit contracts 
with the other stakeholders.   
One conceivable way of overcoming, or at least mitigating, the problem of creating a credible 
commitment is by instituting a system of corporate governance which gives those stakeholders 
who are not shareholders certain rights to protect their interests (Hart, 1993). Thus, the corpo-
rate governance system can also be interpreted as a contract - not a contract stipulating what 
payments and other benefits the stakeholders are entitled to obtain in the future under various 
circumstances, but a constitutional contract defining the rights to influence how unforeseen and 
perhaps unforeseeable future situations shall be dealt with (Laux, 1996). The notion of 
reserving "certain rights" for the other resource contributors or stakeholders is, of course, also 
vague. So what should these rights be? How extensive should they be? They include rights to 
be informed or to discuss or to veto certain decisions or to be involved in the selection and 
monitoring of the people who prepare and implement or ratify these decisions (Ganske, 1996). 
Based on the idea that these rights would be agreed upon in a (constitutional) contract which 
  89determines the governance structure of the firm in such a way that co-operation is facilitated, it 
is evident that rights granted to the other stakeholders should be sufficient to protect them from 
the hazards of opportunism on the part of a firm or its owners or managers acting only in their 
interest. At the same time, these rights would be only those agreed upon in an ideal - costlessly 
written and costlessly enforceable - constitutional contract between all parties concerned or all 
groups of stakeholders in the firm. This latter requirement implies that the outcome of such a 
contract is not the same thing as what proponents of a simple "stakeholder orientation" would 
suggest. In most cases, those who bear the residual risk would bid the most for their interests to 
be given particular weight in the decisions of the firm. Traditionally it may have been self-
evident that those who provide equity capital are the residual risk-bearers most interested in 
acquiring residual control rights. However, it has recently been recognised that in times of 
greater economic change, major lenders and employees with pension claims and/or career 
expectations have increasingly also become residual risk-bearers. That the ideal contract would 
be one concluded simultaneously between all parties is essential because what rights are 
granted to one party has implications - or external effects - for other contracting parties.  
Such a constitutional contract would include the management as a party with a special status as 
its role is to make the concrete decisions involved in running the firm. Therefore, the contracts 
would have to grant to the management a certain degree of freedom to act unilaterally as the 
future unfolds, among other things in order to be able to act in good faith towards those stake-
holders who are not shareholders. But as it is foreseeable that the management will always be 
exposed to the temptation to use this freedom of discretion to act in its own interest, the consti-
tutional contract would also have to include a general rule which would limit management dis-
cretion and provide directions for the exercise of that discretion. Disregarding measurement 
problems for the moment, the general rule would be to maximise the (hypothetical) total value 
of the claims of all stakeholder groups on the firm's resources as seen at the (hypothetical) 
moment at which the contract was concluded. Thus, the contract would establish profit or 
shareholder value maximisation under the restriction that the other constituencies must be 
given "fair" treatment as the objective of the firm which the management would be expected to 
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objective as well as ensure the effectiveness of the constraint placed on management by the 
legitimate concerns of the other constituencies (Schmidt/Spindler, 1997).   
  
5. Explaining and Assessing Corporate Governance Systems  
It goes without saying that the idea of a "constitutional contract" or corporate governance con-
tract determining the distribution of rights among the different groups of stakeholders, 
including the shareholders and the management as particularly important parties to the contract 
or as evidently important constituencies, should not be regarded as a practical device. It is not a 
blueprint for drawing up the charter and the bylaws of a corporation. In reality, such a contract 
would be too difficult to design in the first place, and it would also be impossible to write and 
enforce it. But even as a mere construct it may be useful in several ways. First of all, it provides 
a general answer to the fundamental questions of whether "other constituencies" have relevant 
rights in the context of corporate governance, and what these rights are. The answers are: Yes, 
they have certain rights, and the rights would be those on which all parties would agree in a 
contract concluded under ideal conditions.  
It is impossible to be more specific here, as the substance of such a (hypothetical) contract 
would depend on the specific circumstances under which it were concluded. For instance, the 
extent to which employees would bargain to obtain rights of co-determination would depend on 
the general features of the labour market, on the educational system, on the general orientation 
of the management and on the rights which other constituencies such as lenders had (Aoki, 
1994). The rights which banks would want to obtain (and "pay for" by accepting certain 
compensating obligations as part of the implicit contract) would depend on the bankruptcy law 
of the country, on the structure of the shareholding and the financing patterns of the non-
financial firms involved and on many other factors including the orientation of management 
and the co-determination rights of the employees (Hackethal/Tyrell, 1997). Similar 
considerations apply to the management. 
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should have which rights would appear unjustified, other general statements of a more abstract 
nature can be made. They refer to what I call configurations of rights for different stakeholders, 
or "regimes". As the examples mentioned above indicate, there are two sets of factors which 
determine the attractiveness of certain rights for certain stakeholder groups. One set of factors 
comprises the rights of other stakeholders, and the other set consists of external factors like the 
laws of the country, the structure of its financial sector, the technologies of the firms or the 
nature of competition in the markets in which they operate, etc. Some regimes would not be 
attractive for all parties concerned. This would be the case if the rights of one group 
undermined the functionality of the rights of some other group or if they were incompatible 
with the external factors. Other regimes, in which the different rights of different stakeholders 
would complement each other and be consistent with the external factors, would constitute 
"workable" corporate governance systems.  
Recent research into the nature of the interdependent systems formed by national modes of 
corporate governance and national financial sectors has begun to analyse the concept of 
"regimes" (or, more precisely, the consistency or "systemic" properties of such configurations) 
(Franks/Mayer, 1995; Hackethal/Tyrell, 1997). For instance, the recent literature on the Jap-
anese, American and German systems of corporate governance and, almost as a mirror image, 
of the respective financial sectors, has shown that, at least until a few years ago, the regimes of 
these countries were "workable" and were probably conducive to the economic well-being of 
the countries (Knobling, 1996). By contrast, to date no one has been able - at least as far as I 
know - to discern any workable or consistent system in the interplay of corporate governance 
and financial system in France.  
The single most important author in this field, whose pioneering effort to study the internal 
logic or consistency of different corporate governance systems has very much influenced the 
idea which I have just presented, is Jonathan Charkham, the chairman of this session. His 
insightful work makes it absolutely clear that understanding the "workability" of such regimes 
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explain certain features of these systems, including their stability and their effects on the real 
side of the respective economy; for another, it helps to assess them and to guide the small group 
of persons who, in their capacities as law-makers or major actors, are in a position to influence 
these regimes. For many other economic agents, it is of practical importance to be able to 
understand how the different elements of the corporate governance and financial systems 
interact and either support each other or work against each other. Knowing why and how a 
machine functions has always been a way of enhancing one's ability to benefit from it, as any-
one will know who has ever tried to ride a motorcycle across the United States (Pirsig, 1974).   
 
6. Concluding Remarks about the German System of Corporate Governance 
For me as a German scholar it is an intriguing question whether specific features of the combi-
nation of German corporate governance and the German financial sector with institutionalised 
co-determination rights for employees, the very strong position of the big banks, the underde-
veloped state of the stock markets, and the specific structure of corporate law (H. Schmidt et 
al., 1997), make for a consistent or "workable" regime. I tend to agree with Mr Charkham 
(1994) that they do. However, I am not too sure whether this system is also stable enough to 
withstand the present strains to which it is exposed or whether it is good enough to meet the 
current challenges. I wish to conclude this paper with four observations regarding the systemic 
features of corporate governance cum financial sector in Germany.  
First of all, I want to emphasise how important it is to understand the system well. Let me 
illustrate this by giving a brief account of how a newly-appointed chief executive of a very 
important German corporation has evidently had to learn this lesson the hard way. After the law 
which enables firms to limit payments to employees on sick leave was passed in parliament in 
the autumn of 1996, the new chairman of Daimler-Benz, Jürgen Schrempp, was one of the first 
to seize this opportunity and push for a decision by Daimler's management board to cut benefits 
to which the employees felt they were entitled as a long-standing, well-established right. In the 
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strongest advocates of a strict shareholder value orientation and earned considerable praise for 
this in the conservative press. It does not appear too far-fetched to call the decision by the board 
of Daimler-Benz an act of opportunism in the technical sense of the term coined by Williamson 
(1975 and 1985). It appears that Mr. Schrempp did not really understand the German system 
because after a few days the board had to rescind its decision, and this was probably not so 
much a consequence of the strikes that took place as it was an outgrowth of the belated 
recognition that the planned restructuring of the Daimler-Benz group could never be undertaken 
without the co-operation of the employees and their union. Mr. Schrempp went so far as to 
declare in public that he would never use the term "shareholder value" again, as Der Spiegel 
(No. 47/1996, p.122) reported gloatingly a few days later. This incident was a quite striking 
practical demonstration of something that, at a more abstract level, was already well-known, 
namely the extent to which the entire German socio-economic system is based on rules which 
put great emphasis on a "reaso nable" consensus. This general feature is also reflected in the 
corporate governance system and in the way labour representatives and banks tend to behave in 
their roles as active participants in the governance of non-financial corporations.  
The second observation refers to the problems entailed in changing the system. If it is indeed 
true that giving important groups of "other constituencies" an active role in German corporate 
governance has been a wise step and has helped German industry to develop its particular com-
petitive strengths, as Mr. Charkham (1994, esp. p. 43-49) argues convincingly in his book, then 
this casts doubt on the wisdom of certain recent developments which aim at changing elements 
of this coherent and functional system or "regime". As reasonable as they may appear at first 
glance, some individual reform measures may be detrimental to the consistency - or the wor-
kability - of the system (Schmidt/Tyrell, 1997, p. 178). I am not too sure what implications 
recent and current efforts to strengthen the role of the stock market, and especially to make 
hostile take-overs easier and to introduce stock-option plans tying management more closely to 
the immediate interests of shareholders will have for the workability of a system of corporate 
governance and general corporate policy which is so strongly based on discussion, consensus 
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"insider system" and an "outsider system", to use the classification of Franks/Mayer (1995). 
The possible outcome might ultimately not be any consistent system at all.  
The most striking empirical evidence to support the contention that it would be difficult to com-
bine the features of the traditional German ”insider control” system in which the banks play a 
central role of the banks with capital market-based control mechanisms like take-overs, was 
provided on the final day of this conference: The top news story on that day was that Krupp-
Hoesch was attempting a hostile take-over of Thyssen, an attempt which was abandoned only a 
few days later because it was not likely to succeed. The reasons for this failure can easily be 
traced to the importance and the nature of the other elements of the German system of corporate 
governance and financing. 
The third concluding observation deals with the dynamics of change and looks briefly at the 
possible future of corporate governance in Germany. More important in this context than 
internal German changes are international developments such as the globalisation of financial 
markets and the process of European harmonisation and integration. These trends give rise to 
regulatory and competitive pressures. It would require more space than I have here to discuss at 
sufficient length why I believe that the likely outcome of the ongoing process of regulatory 
harmonisation and interpenetration of the vastly different systems of corporate governance and 
finance in the various European countries may not be anything like a smooth transition to a 
compromise or a middle-of-the-road position somewhere between the German and the English 
systems which would incorporate the strengths of both systems (but see Schmidt/Tyrell, 1997). 
If one wishes to assess likely future developments, one must understand that these systems are 
indeed systems, i.e. their different elements are designed, and function, in such a way that they 
tend to reinforce each other's effectiveness. Therefore, selective changes to individual elements 
of the systems can hardly be expected to change the general way in which the systems operate. 
This creates a certain rigidity, and rigidity may cause a system to "break", i.e. break down. For 
this reason, we should bear in mind that a process of transition could involve considerable 
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particularly vulnerable to this danger. This, in turn, is the reason why an abrupt end to what, in 
my view, still constitutes its strength and "workability" might be ahead. It remains to be seen 
whether the above-mentioned attempt by Krupp-Hoesch to take over Thyssen in a hostile 
manner in mid-March, and the damage which this seems to have done to the reputation of the 
two largest German banks, marks the beginning of a bumpy transition process. 
Finally, we should remember precisely what it is that made the German post-war system work 
so well in more prosperous times - namely the emphasis on discussion and consensus, a certain 
degree of immobility and a certain lack of transparency, the sharing of active roles in corporate 
governance among several actors with some conflicting and some common interests, and, as a 
consequence of all this, a high degree of stability and/or inflexibility within the German regime 
of corporate governance cum financial system, and possibly also a corresponding instability 
and/or inflexibility on the part of the large German corporations which have had to operate 
under this regime. We must recognise that this simply may not be the most appropriate system 
for the new era of global and dynamic competition and change. However, these very same 
features of our system make it difficult even to conceive of alternatives that might be better, to 
envision where change could lead us, and to imagine how - and by whom - change might be 
initiated.   
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